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Dale Carter Shackelford, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/18/2011

MOTN

BETH

Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause

John R. Stegner

AFFD

BETH

Affidavit of Dale C. Shakelford

John R. Stegner

MOTN

BETH

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

John R. Stegner

PETN

BETH

Petition for Post Conviction Relief

John R. Stegner

4/11/2011

ANSR

BETH

Answer to "[Successive] Petition for PostConviction Relief'

John R. Stegner

4/20/2011

ORDR

SUE

Order DENYING Motion to Disqualify Judge

John R. Stegner

4/25/2011

REPL

SUE

5/3/2011

ORDR

SUE

5/6/2011

MOTN

BETH

Petitioner's Reply to State's Answer to Successive John R. Stegner
Petition for POst Conviction Relief
John R. Stegner
Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for
Appointment of Counsel
John R. Stegner
Motion for Summary Disposition

5/18/2011

MOTN

SUE

Motion for Reconsideration

5/31/2011

MOTN

SUE

7/8/2011

ORDR

SUE

ORDR

SUE

2/3/2012

MOTN

SUE

7/11/2012

MOTN

SUE

AMPT

SUE

MOTN

SUE

Motion for Leave to File Addendum to Successive John R. Stegner
Petition for Post Conviction Relief
John R. Stegner
Order DENYING Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration
John R. Stegner
Order SUSPENDING Petitioner's [Successive]
File
to
Leave
for
Motion
his
Denying
Petition,
Addendum, and Denying the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition
John R. Stegner
Motion for Review by District Court of Proposed
Stipulation
John R. Stegner
Motion to Amend (Successive) Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
John R. Stegner
Amended (Successive) Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief
John R. Stegner
Motion to Resume Proceedings

NOTC

SUE

Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Stipulations

John R. Stegner

MOTN

SUE

Motion for Appointment of Counsel and
Evidentiary Hearing on Post Conviction Petition

John R. Stegner

MOTN

SUE

Motion to Take Judicial Notice

John R. Stegner

8/6/2012

NTHR

SUE

Notice Of Hearing

John R. Stegner

8/7/2012

ORDR

SUE

Order Vacating Hearing

John R. Stegner

8/9/2012

RSPN

SUE

John R. Stegner
Response to Motion to Resume Proceedings,
and
Counsel
of
nt
Motion for Appointme
Evidentiary Hearing, Motion to Take Judicial
Notice and Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition
for Post Conviction Relief

John R. Stegner
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Dale Carter Shackelford, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

8/13/2012

HRSC

TERRY

8/20/2012

SUE

8/23/2012

NTHR
MOTN

John R. Stegner
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/29/2012 10:00
,
Proceedings
Resume
to
Motion
AM) Petitioner's
MOtion for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary
Hearing on Post Conviction Petitione, Motion to
take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend
Petitioner
John R. Stegner
Notice Of Hearing

SUE

Motion to Vacate and Reset Hearing

John R. Stegner

9/4/2012

MOTN

SUE

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition of
Pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel

John R. Stegner

9/7/2012

RSPN

SUE

John R. Stegner
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Disposition of Pending Motion for Appointment of
Counsel

10/25/2012

CONT

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Continued (Motion 12/12/2012 09:30 AM)
Petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings,
Motion for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary
Hearing on Post Conviction Petitione, Motion to
take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend
Petitioner by TCC

TERRY

Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing

12/12/2012

ORDR
CONT

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Continued (Motion 01/16/2012 09:30 AM)
Petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings,
Motion for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary
Hearing on Post Conviction Petitione, Motion to
take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend
Petitioner by TCC 208-331-2760 Ext. 20872

ORDR

TERRY

Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing

DCHH

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/16/2013 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 20 pages

CTMN

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/16/2013 09:30 AM: Court Minutes
Petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings,
Motion for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary
Hearing on Post Conviction Petitione, Motion to
take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend
Petitioner by TCC 208-331-2760 Ext. 20819

11/18/2013

NOTC

SUE

Notice of Withdrawal of Petitioner's Motion to
Amend Successive Petition for Post Conviction
Relief

John R. Stegner

SUE

Motion to Set a Scheduling Conference

John R. Stegner

12/6/2013

MOTN
MOTN

SUE

Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief

John R. Stegner

AMPT

SUE

Amended [Successive] Petition for POst
Conviction Relief Filed

John.,R. St8Qner

1/16/2013

John R. Stegner

John R. Stegner
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Dale Carter Shackelford, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Selected Items
Dale Carter Shackelford, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

12/6/2013

MOTN

SUE

Motion to Appoint Counsel

John R. Stegner

12/13/2013

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/13/2014 10:30

John R. Stegner

12/18/2013

ORDR

TERRY

Order Setting Status Conference

1/2/2014

RSPN

SUE

1/13/2014

DCHH

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Response to Application for Post Conviction
for
Petition
]
[Successive
Relief, Motion to Amend
Post Conviction Relief, Motion to Appoint
Counsel, and Renewed Motion for Summary
Disposition
John R. Stegner
Hearing result for Status scheduled on
01/13/2014 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 30 pages

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
01/13/2014 10:30 AM: Court Minutes DOC
1-208-331-2760 Ext 20872

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/28/2014 09:30
AM) hearing of all pending motions by TCC
Dale Shackelford 208-331-2760, ext. 20872

John R. Stegner

1/14/2014

ORDR

TERRY

Order Setting Hearing of All Pending Motions

John R. Stegner

1/28/2014

DCHH

TERRY

John R. Stegner
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/28/2014 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 40 pages
Dale Shackelford 208-331-2760, ext. 20872

TERRY

Court Minutes

3/7/2014

CTMN
ORDR

SUE
SUE

4/23/2014

NAPL
MOTN

Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel John R. Stegner
and Granting Summary Dismissal
John R. Stegner
Notice Of Appeal

SUE

Motion for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal
from Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post
Conviction Relief

John R. Stegner

6/23/2014

LETT

Letter from Dale Shackelford

John R. Stegner

OBJC

RANAE
RANAE

Objection to Clerk's Certificate

John R. Stegner

7/17/2014

ORDR

RANAE

Order Granting Motion for Appointment of
Counsel on Appeal

John R. Stegner

7/18/2014

LETT

RANAE

Letter from Dale Shackelford

John R. Stegner

7/24/2014

MISC

RANAE

JDMT

RANAE

S.C. - Order Remanding to District Court for Final John R. Stegner
Judgment
John R. Stegner
Judgment: DISMISSED with prejudice

9/8/2014

NAPL

10/1/2014

NLT

RANAE
RANAE

3/21/2014

AM)
John R. Stegner

John R. Stegner

Amended Notice Of Appeal

John R. Stegner

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

John R. Stegner
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

····'}

'J ,, }.

ORDER REGARDING MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTION OF
,\,.::·i.. lA'f
ECO UN SEL
';.,,.;:..,
" ,flc:.1.
..
•

V.

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Cross Appellant.

J

<.

UE:fENOERsupreme Court No. 27966
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 31928

A MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COU
NSEL with attachment was filed by
Appellant on January 11, 2008.
A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MO
TION FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL was filed
January 23, 2008. After due consideratio
n and good
cause appeanng,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appella
nt's MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL be, and hereby is, REC
OGNIZED, and will be treated as a
Notice of
Substitution pursuant to I.C. 19-871 and
I.A.R. 45 as there is no legal, justiciable
issue to be
decided.
DATED this __,,_J-_q_··__ January 2008.
By Order of the Supreme Court

Cc:

Counsel of Record
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
WILLIAM \V. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
(208) 883-2246
ISB No. 2613
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH;E SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

. CASE NO. CV-2001-04272

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

ANSWER TO "[SUCCESSIVE]
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF"

Respondent.
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting
Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner's (Dale Carter Shackelford) ''[Successive]
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" in the above-entitled action as follows:
I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically
admitted herein.
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II.
SPECIFIC ANSlVERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS

1.

Regarding the portion of the petition entitled "Background," the State

admits:
a.

On December 22, 2000, jury verdicts of guilty were rendered in Latah

County Case Number CR-2000-00260, State of Idaho v. Dale Carter Shackelford,
finding the defendant (petitioner herein) guilty of:

b.

i.

Count I - First Degree Murder of Donna Fontaine;

ii.

Count II - First Degree Murder of Fred Palahniuk;

m.

Count III - First Degree Arson;

iv.

Count IV - Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder;

v.

Count V - Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson;

v1.

Count VI - Preparing False Evidence.

On October 25, 2001, the Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge,

sentenced petitioner as follows:
1.

Count I - Death;

ii.

Count II - Death;

iii.

Count III - Twenty-five years, fixed;

1v.

Count IV - Life, fixed;
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v.

Count V - Twenty five years, fixed;

vi.

Count VI - Five years, fixed.

The court records reflect that the written judgment of conviction was
entered on November 1, 2001.
c.

On November 9, 2001, the Court appointed the State Appellate Public

Defender (SAPD) to represent petitioner for purposes of pursuing postconviction relief.

Subsequently, on December 6, 2001, a Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief was filed herein on behalf of petitioner which petition, over the
course of the next several years, was supplemented and amended on numerous
occas10ns.

After lengthy post-conviction proceedings, the Court entered

memorandum decisions and orders regarding both petitioner's Motion for
Summary Disposition and the State's Motion to Dismiss. The net effect of those
orders was to set aside the death penalties on Counts I and II based on the 2002
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122
S.Ct. 2428, 152 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). In all other respects, the verdicts of guilty, and
the sentences on Count III, IV, V, and VI, were upheld. Petitioner then filed a
Notice of Appeal of these post-conviction proceeding decisions on May 20, 2005,
and the State filed a cross appeal on the same date.
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d.

The Petitioner also timely filed a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences in CR-00-00260 on December 4, 2001.

That appeal was ultimately

heard by the Idaho Supreme Court in conjunc~on with the appeals of the postconviction decisions in this case, and the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its
substitute opinion on June 1, 2010 in State v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582. In its
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the District Court,
sustained the verdicts of guilty on all counts and the sentences on Counts III - VI.
It also set aside of the death penalty on Counts I and II in light of the subsequent
Ring decision but on different grounds. Following the denial of Petitions for
Writs of Certiorari sought by both petitioner and the State, the Idaho Supreme
Court's remittitur was filed in Latah County on March 21, 2011. Petitioner's case
has now been remanded to the Latah County District Court for resentencing on
Counts I and II.
e.

During the course of these post-conviction proceedings, petitioner filed a

pro se Motion for Declaratory Judgment on June 6, 2003, which, after briefing and
argument, was effectively denied by the District Court on or about March 8,
2004. Petitioner thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2004, although
the actual order of the District Court denying petitioner's pro se Motion for
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Declaratory Judgment and companion pro se Motion for Appointment of Counsel
was not filed until May 12, 2004. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Idaho
Supreme Court by order filed on June 24, 2004 (remittitur filed June 28, 2004).
f.

On December 1, 2006, petitioner filed a "Motion to Reconsider Order

Appointing State Appellate Pubiic Defenderu which motion was denied by the
Court on February 9, 2007, following consideration of responsive pleadings of
the parties. Subsequently, the SAPD filed a motion to vacate the Court's order
denying the defendant's motion to reconsider order appointing State Appellate
Public Defender on March 23, 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Court entered an
order vacating its February 9 order denying the defendant's motion to reconsider
the order appointing the SAPD. During this time, attorney Teresa Hampton was
retained as separate counsel for petitioner and there were requests for workload
assessments in addition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the SAPD
appointment order.

An order denying petitioner's request for workload

assessment was entered on September 26, 2007. On October 10, 2007, petitioner
requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of his
workload assessment request.

This filing was done on petitioner's behalf by

attorney Teresa Hampton who had been brought in as special counsel for
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petitioner. Subsequently, on October 31, 2007, Ms. Hampton filed a "Motion to
Withdraw Request for Permission to File Appeal from an Interlocutory Order."
Thereafter, all of the remaining issues were addressed through the appeals
process culminating in the Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, Substitute
Opinion referenced above.
2.

In regard to the portion of the petition entitled "Argument (1) Review of

Petition" (beginning on page 6 of the petition), the State denies that the provisions of
Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) apply. Idaho Code § 19-2719 applies only to appellate and
post-conviction procedures where the death penalty is imposed. In the case at bar, by
virtue of Judge Stegner 1s April 8, 2005, memorandum decisions and orders, and the
Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in
this case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for resentencing.
Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence to which the provisions of
Idaho Code § 19-2719 apply.
Additionally, even if Idaho Code § 19-2719 were to apply at this stage,
petitioner's instant "[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" is facially
insufficient in that it does not identify in any fashion (by precise statement with
material facts stated under oath by credible persons with first hand knowledge, or
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otherwise) any "issues that were not known or could not reasonably have been known"
so as to be raised and addressed in the original post-conviction proceedings. See §
Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(a). In fact, eyery issue referred to by petitioner is, on its face, not
new and either was or reasonably should have been known during the course of the
extensive original post-conviction proceedings herein which, as noted above, ran from
the filing of the initial post-conviction petition on December 6, 2001, through the Court's
memorandum decisions and orders of April 8, 2005, over three years later. The State
further respectfully submits that petitioner's current assertions are largely cumulative
and, even if true, would not cast doubt on the reliability of the convictions or sentences
that have been upheld through the prior post-conviction and appellate proceedings.
Similarly, to the extent that petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 194901, et. seq., through his instant "[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the
issues he attempts to raise were either previously raised and addressed or have been
waived, and there is no basis alleged to support a finding that "sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended
application" for any of the instant claimed grounds for relief. See Idaho Code § 19-4908.
In short, each of petitioner's claims in the instant "[Successive] Petition for PostConviction Relief" were either raised and addressed in the prior proceedings (and are
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therefore res judicata) or were waived (and petitioner is collaterally and statutorily
estopped from attempting to assert them at this late date).
3.

In response to Section (2) of Petitioner's "Argument" (beginning at page 7),

petitioner, without citing to any legal authority on point, attempts to argue that a jury is
required to determine facts regarding sentencing where the death penalty is not
imposed. That assertion is inconsistent with Idaho law as it existed at the time of the
defendant's convictions and original sentences in 2000 and 2001, as well as under
current Idaho law which has been amended to comply with Ring. A jury's role in
sentencing under Ring is to determine whether a statutory aggravating factor exists
beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, to then weigh any mitigating evidence before a
sentence of death can be imposed. If a sentence of death is not sought or imposed, a
jury has no role in a First Degree Murder sentencing. In the instant case, the sentencing
court specifically noted that the State did not seek the death penalty on Count IV, th
Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder conviction (Transcript pp. 5599-6000
attached). Additionally, the defendant is not prejudiced by the lack of jury involvemen
in the sentencing on Count IV be~ause the death penalty was not imposed and, eve
under current law, it is the Court, not the jury, that imposes a sentence other than death
(Idaho Code§ 19-2515(7)(c)).

r
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Finally, as to this and virtually all of the petitioner's other allegations, if this issue
was not raised in the original post-conviction proceedings and appeal, it certainly could
or should have been and is therefore waived.
4.

As to Petitioner's "Argument (3) 11 beginning at page 10, his assertions of

disproportionality are not based on anything new, and could and should have been
raised in the prior post-conviction proceedings and/ or on appeal. As such, petitioner's
claim of disproportionality has been waived and is barred.
Additionally, as the Court properly considered at the time of sentencing, the
petitioner's role in the conspiracy was substantially greater than that of either of the coconspirators in that the petitioner was the actual murderer and arsonist, originated the
solicitations for murder and so forth. Petitioner also has a substantial criminal history
compared to essentially no prior criminal history for either of the co-conspirators.
These factors justify a substantially different and more serious sentence for the
petitioner based on his history, conduct and prospective danger to society.
5.

In regard to petitioner's "Argument (4) 11 questioning the impartiality of the

District Court (beginning at page 13), petitioner argues that somehow the Court's
refusal to admit him to bail warrants post-conviction relief.

In the first instance,

petitioner asserts nothing new that could not have been raised in the prior post-
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conviction and appeal proceedings. Second, petitioner was not entitled to bail under
Article 1 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, LC. § 19-2903 and I.CR. 46(b). Finally,
even if his allegations are true, there is nothing to suggest that they would cast doubt on
the reliability of the convictions and sentences which have subsequently undergone
lengthy and detailed scrutiny in both the prior post-conviction and appellate
proceedings.
6.

In

regard

to

petitioner's

"Argument

misconduct, petitioner alleges nothing new:

(5)"

alleging

prosecutorial

all of his assertions either were or

reasonably could and should have been known and raised during the original postconviction and appellate proceedings.

In fact, many issues regarding allegations of

prosecutorial misconduct were raised and litigated throughout the post-conviction and
appellate proceedings.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised in the original postconviction proceeding or on direct appeal, the claims are procedurally defaulted, barred
ANSWER TO "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR
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as res judicata, and collaterally and statutorily estopped. Idaho Code§§ 19-4901(b) and
19-4908.

----

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent that Petitioner asserts claims not specifically raised previously,
has failed to file such claims within the one year statute of limitation and the claims
now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a).
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The "[Successive]" Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" contains bare and
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible
evidence, and therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 194902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.
PRIOR RECORD
Respondent incorporates the prior pleadings, documents and other records in
this case in addition to asking that the Court take judicial notice of the trial and
appellate proceedings referenced in this case.
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
a)

That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;
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b)

That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily dismissed

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906;
c)

for such olr and further relief as the court dee

DATED this

j\

day of Ap~20

.

I
William W. Thompson
Prosecuting Attorne
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necessary in the case.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO
(SUCCESSIVE) PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF was
/

mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
hand delivered

__ sent by facsimile, original by mail
to the following:
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613
IMSI, Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

Dated this / Nh

day of April, 2011.
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They
death penalty. He said it, his counsel said it.
1
l ook at the Court and say, don t kill the defendant,
but it 's himwho has placed himself in this positio1n.,
He has earned it every step of the way. This Court s
not killing the defendant by imposing the death
penalty .
What this Court is doing .is followi~g the
statutory procedure, totaling up the evidence,
weighing the factors, considering the alternatives,
weighing the various issues that the Court has raised
today of statutory interpretation and then re3ching
. the conclusion that is inescapable and unavoidable.
And that's that as a proper sanction for the worst and
the most evil act that our system can punish for -- on
behalf of Donna Fontaine, Fred Palahniuk and the
people of Idaho, we're asking this Court sentence the
defendant to death.
Thank you, Your Hcnor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Eckmann.
Mr. Mahaffy, Mr. Barker, anything else to
submit?
MR. BP.RKER: Your Honor, what are you
asking?
THE COURT: Do you have anything else to
submit?

5997

MR. BP.R~J:R: Ko, Your Honor.

THE COURT: .Then I consider this matter
ely
complet at issue. And if I can get a decision
written by the 19th of October, we'll have the
senter.cing on the 19th of October, and if I can't, we
will do it later. It is my fervent hope to have a
written decision on the 19th of October.
MS. ECKMANN : Will the Court r.ot ify us in
advance of whether we'll -THE COURT: Yes.
MS. ECKMANN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else we need to tak-e
up?
MS. ECKMJI..NN: Nothing from the State.
MR. BARKER: Nothing.
THE COURT: Then we are in recess.
[COURT RECESSED AT 5:28 P.M.)
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THURSDAY, OC10BER 25, 2001 - 9:04 A.M .
THE: COURT: We are on the record in Latah
County Case No. CR-00-00 260. It's the State of Idaho
versus Dale Carter Shackelford. Present in court are
Ms. Eckmann and Mr. Christer.sen on behalf of the
State . Present on behalf of Mr. Shackelford are Mr.
Barker and Mr. Mahaffy and Mr. Shackelford is present
at counsel table with his attorneys .
On December 22, 2000 a jury in Latah
County convicted Mr. Shackelford of the following
offenses, murder in the first degree of Donna
Fontaine, which carries with it a maxinum penalty of
death or a present sentence of ten years -- minimum
prison sentence of ten years with a maximum prison
sentence of life. Mr. Shackelford was also convicted
of the murder of Fred Palahniuk, that offense carries
with it a death penalty as well as life with a minimu.m
of ten years confinement.
He was also convicted of conspiracy to
ccmmit ~urder, which carries with it a maximum penalty
of death or life with a minimum of ten years
confinement. He was also convicted of arson in the
first degree, which carries with it a maximUJtt penalty
of 25 years. Conspiracy to commit arson in the first
degree, which carries with it maximum penalty of 25
5999
arries
which.c
years. And preparing false evidence,
with it a five-year maximwn penalty.
Does the defendant have_any lawful cause
judgment should not be pronounced against
why
to know
time?
him at this
MR. BARKER: No, Your Honor.
THE: COU~T: Under Idaho law in a capital
case a judge is required to make written findings
regarding his or her determination that the death
penalty is or is not correct. I have endeavored to
put my findings :n writing and I am signing them this
25th day of October, 2001.
I have a copy for Mr. Shackelford.
Would you please provide that to him.
(BAILIFF COMPLIES)
THE COURT: Mr.. Shackelford, have you been
provided: a copy 0f that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Then on the conviction of
murder in the first degree of Donna Fontaine I impose
the penalty of death . for the murder of fred
Palahni uk, I impose the penalty of death. On the
conspi racy to commit murder, I construe the argument .
m2de by the State at t he time of the sentencing
recommendations to wi thdraw the requesI for the

0.00056
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~nalty of death for that charge and I impose a fixed
ife imprisonment for that.
For the arson in the first degree, I
1q,ose a sentence of 25 years. For the conspiracy to
coaroi t arson in the first degree, I impose a 25-year
·entente. In the prepa:ing fa lse evidence, I impose a
five-year sentence fi:sed. Zach of those is a fixed
term and they will run concurrently. I don't bow of
any reason to pile on.
You have a right to appeal this decision.
In fact, there is a stat:Jte that makes an appeal or a
review. by the Supreme Coi;rt of this decision
mandatory, but I need to advise you that if you want
to challenge any of my legal er factual determinations
-in this trial, you need to file an appeal. That
appeal must be filed within 42 days of the filing of a
:judgment.
Ms. Eckmann, would you submit a judgment
effect?
that
to
MS. ECKMANN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: To the effect of what I have
'pronounced orally.
You also need to know that your appeal
.,,
·must identify any remedies that would avai:able to you
'under post-ccnviction acticns in this state.

1 available to you, Mr. Shackelford.
Your attorneys, Mr. Barker and Mr.
2
3 Mahaffy, will continue to represent you in the things
4 that are necessary for you to bring an appeal of any
5 factual or legal challenge to the sentence of
6 conviction or to the proceedings that briJg us to the
7 imposition of that conviction.
It may be that at scme point I will assign
8
9 the state appellate public defender to represent you
10 in the bringing of the appeal as well as the
11 post-conviction remedy, but that, I think, is a
12 question for another day.
So, I am appointing the counsel for you to
13
14 purs~e your post-conviction remedies, which would
15 include, as.I have indicated, ineffective assistance
16 of counsel. You' 11 need to work closely with that
17 attorney to perfect whatever rights you have available
18 . to you to challenge the conviction en that basis.
Is there anything else we need to take up?
19
MS. ECKMANN: Your Honor, I believe with
20
21 regard to the transcript, if the Court can make
22 directions.
THE COURT: Since there is an automatic
23
24 review by the Supreme Court a:id I believe statutory
25 authority, the clerk and the court reporter are
6003
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..Primariiy that means that if you want to assert tha t
·, your ccunsel was ineffective in representing you, you
. need to assert that as an issue of appeal immediately.
Mr. Christensen?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I believe
.that's a whole separate proceeding. It's not an issue
:of appeal, post-conviction. And I would point out
19-2719 for the Court. And also for the Court to
inquire the need for new counsel under 19-27i9(a },
THE COURT: Do you have anybody in mind?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, the state
: public appellate defender's office.
~BE COURT: Then would you subi~it an order
to that effect?
MS. ECKMANN: Appointing the state
· appellate public defender's office?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. ECKMANN: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor, nay we approach?
;BE COURT: Yes, you may.
ISIDE BAR HAD- NOT REPCRTE0l
(D~fENSE CONfE~SJ
THE COURT: To clarify the record, 1 am
appointing tr.estate appellate public defender to
pursue any post-ccnvicLon remedies that you may have

1·
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

directed· to· begin preparation of a transcript and toe
preparation of the record as quickly as possible .
MS. ECKMANN: And then, Your Hcncr, I have
one additional point of clarification, just with
regard to the Court's order that the sentences run
concurrent, can the Court c:arify which sentences run
concurrent with each other?
THE COURT: All of the sentences run
concurre::it.
MS. ECKMANN: Alright.
HR. BARKER: I assume after this
proceeding that we -can get a copy of the findings from
the Court?
THE COURT: Yes. And I have signed those.
They will be made available to you as quickly as we
can have copies made.
MR. BARKER: Thcnk you.
THE COURT: Is t:iere anything else we need
to take up?
MR. BARKER: No, Your Honor .
MS. ECKMANN: Nothing from the State, Your
:lonor.
7HE COURT: Mr. Shackelford, may Gcd have
me rcy on your soul.
We' re in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2001-4272

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE

)
)
)

Respondent.
______________
)

The Petitioner, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), filed a motion
requesting that this Court disqualify itself from presiding over his [Successive]
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Shackelford listed lack of impartiality and
interest in the pending action as grounds for his motion brought under I.R.C.P.
40(d)(2). Because this Court is unpersuaded that partiality or an interest in the
pending action exists, the motion to disqualify will be denied.
Good cause appearing,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE - I

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause is
DENIED.
DATED this

z 1>~ y of April

)::t?- r \ ~

John R. S t e g n e r .
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing
Order were delivered to the following as indicated:
Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
-fTFax
[ ] Hand Delivery

William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
fflland Delivery

Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

[·1U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

On this

~ day of April 2011.

r,
ty Clerk Jr t~e Co. ~rt
.{
! D ( ? ,)

Latah_Qol
By:
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2001-4272

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

______________ )

On March 18, 2011, Petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a
Motion for Appointment of Counsel asking this Court to appoint counsel to represent
him in his post-conviction case. For the reasons stated, Shackelford's motion will be
denied, without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder,
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts.
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and
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imposed prison sentences for the other felonies. Shackelford appealed and because
he was sentenced to death he simultaneously brought an action seeking postconviction relief In 2005, this Court granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition
to have his death sentences set aside, found three other claims moot, denied his
remaining claims, and ultimately found that the multiple-murder aggravator of I.C.
§ 19-2515 had been established. Shackelford appealed aspects of these rulings, and
the State cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions
as to guilt and post-conviction relief but remanded for a new sentencing hearing
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, as it pertains to the two first-degree murder charges.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 7, 2011 and the Idaho Supreme
Court then issued a Remittitur. Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel
to represent him in his underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000260).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case.
A request for the appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is
governed by the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), I.C. § 19-4901

et seq. Under the UPCPA, court-appointed counsel "may be made available to the
applicant" upon the showing of need. I.C. § 19-4904 (italics added). "[A] needy
applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau

v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). LC.§ 19-852(b)(3)
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describes the standard for determining whether such a proceeding is frivolous. Id.
According to

§ 19-852(b)(3), a needy defendant is entitled to representation at

with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense."

B. Timeliness.
LC. § 19-2719 governs post-conviction procedure in capital cases. Under LC.
§ 19-2719(3), a defendant should file a challenge to the sentence or conviction
"[w]ithin forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment." Failure to do so
constitutes a waiver of all claims that "were known, or reasonably should have been
known" at that time. LC. § 19-2719(5). According to McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 704, 992 P.2d 144, 153 (1999), this waiver applies "only to claims challenging
the death sentence itself, not to all claims brought in conjunction with death
sentences."
"The legislature instituted the procedures of LC.§ 19-2719 'to accomplish the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.'
I.C. § 19-2719." Id. Thus, "[i]f necessary to avoid delay and accomplish the
legislative purpose, a district court may sever non-death issues from death issues in
post-conviction proceedings." Id. In McKinney, the court declined to analyze the
non-death issues because they were untimely under LC. § 19-4902, but analyzed
the death-issues under LC. § 19-2719. Id.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), which is found in
I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., governs "all post-conviction claims that do not involve the
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death sentence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. I.C. § 19-4902(a)
states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction relief] may be filed at

· one (1) year

the expiration of the time for appeal or

time

the

determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an

appeal, whichever is later." (Italics added.)
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman v.

State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089 - 1090 (Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was
remanded for a sentencing hearing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, Shackelford has yet
to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree murder. Even though the
sentencing will not involve several of the charges in this case, it appears to be a
"proceeding following an appeal," as is contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(a). It is an
extension of the underlying criminal action - part of the continuous stream of
events. Therefore, the proper time for Shackelford to file for post-conviction relief is
within one year after he is sentenced pursuant to LC. § 19-2515. Severing the case
and hearing the non-death issues now would not serve to eliminate unnecessary
delay in carrying out a death sentence. Thus, Shackelford's post-conviction petition
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is untimely. A reasonable person would not bring such a petition at this time.
Good cause appearing,
IS ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for

of Counsel

DENIED, without prejudice.
DATED this

2,.

,.so
day of May 2011.

r~~

Jo~ R. Stegner
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL were delivered to the following as indicated:
Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604

rfU.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
f1 Hand Delivery

Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

f:tU.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

On this ----=-- day of May 2011.

I'

IJ

~

Latah ~ ~ e r f the 51jillrk .
,
By:
~
&t) ~{/WUJ\,,/
Deputy Clerk
~
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2
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
(208) 883-2246
ISB No. 2613

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,

)

CASE NO. CV-2001-04272

Petitioner,
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting
Attorney, and hereby moves for summary disposition of Petitioner's "[Successive]
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief'' pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4906(c) for the reasons
detailed in the State's "Answer to '[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief'" filed
herein on April 11, 2011. Petitioner's convictiqns and sentences on Counts III (First
Degree Arson), Count IV (Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder), Count V
(Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson), and Count VI (Preparing False Evidence),
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -1-

have been upheld on appeal and are, therefore final. Petitioner fails to raise any issues
that were not or could not have been raised in said appeal and, consequently, is not
entitled to pursue any further relief on those convictions and sentences.
Pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4906(c), Respondent respectfully submits that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATEDthis

S

dayofMay,2

William W. Thompson, Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
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4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION was
/

mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
hand delivered

__ sent by facsimile, original by mail
to the following:
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613
IMSI, Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH .
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-2001-4272

)

ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.
______________
)

On May 18, 2011, petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B)) asking this Court to reconsider its May
2, 2011, Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. For the
reasons stated, Shackelford's motion will be denied, without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder,
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts.
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and
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imposed prison sentences for the other charges. Shackelford appealed and
simultaneously brought an action seeking post-conviction relief. In 2005, this Court
granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition to have his death sentences set aside,
found three other claims moot, and denied his remaining claims. Shackelford
appealed aspects of these rulings, and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho
Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions as to guilt and post-conviction·relief
and remanded for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to LC.§ 19-2515, as it
pertains to the two first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied

certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur.
Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel to represent him in his
underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000-260).
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause, a
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Capital Case, and a [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief Capital Case. The State filed an Answer to "[Successive] Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief' and Shackelford filed a reply. This Court denied
Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause and also issued an Order Denying
Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter, Shackelford filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP ll(a)(2)(B)). Since then, the State has
indicated that it will not seek a death sentence for the two remaining charges in
Shackelford's underlying criminal case.
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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case.
As this Court stated in its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment
of Counsel, a request for the appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding
is governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), LC. § 194901 et seq. Under the UPCPA, court-appointed counsel "may be made available to
the applicant" upon the showing of need. LC.§ 19-4904 (italics added). "[A] needy
applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau

v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). Idaho Code§ 19-852(b)(3)
describes the standard for determining whether such a proceeding is frivolous. Id.
According to LC. § 19-852(b)(3), a needy defendant is entitled to representation at
public expense unless the proceeding is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense."

Timeliness.
Title 19, Chapter 27, of the Idaho Code governs criminal procedure in capital
cases. Shackelford argues that LC. § 19-2719 et seq. applies to this case. Idaho
Code§ 19-2719 sets forth the special procedures which are to "be interpreted to
accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid
death sentence."
The State aptly notes, however, that:
In the case at bar, by virtue of Judge Stegner's April 8, 2005,
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memorandum decisions and orders, and the Idaho Supreme Court's
June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in this
case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for
resentencing. Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence
19 apply.
to which the provisions of Idaho Code §
(Answer to "[Successive] Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief' at 6.) Further, the State
has since indicated that it will not seek the death sentence on remand. Since the
death sentence imposed in this case was set aside, and a new death sentence is not
being sought, LC. § 19-2719 et seq. does not apply to this case. In addition, I.C.R.
Rule 44.2, which requires appointment of counsel for post-conviction review in a
death penalty case, no longer applies.
Idaho Code § 19-4901 et seq. governs "all post-conviction claims that do not
involve the death sentence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction relief] may
be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or
from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding
following an appeal, whichever is later."
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Atkinson, 131 Idaho 222, 224,
953 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman u.
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State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089-1090 (Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was remanded
for sentencing, Shackelford

to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree

murder. Even though the sentencing will not upset the judgment of conviction, it
appears to be a "proceeding following an appeal," as is contemplated by LC. § 194902(a). It is an extension of the underlying criminal action - part of the
continuous stream of events. Therefore, Shackelford has until one year after this
Court imposes a sentence for the first degree murder charges to pursue postconviction claims.
According to Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 425, 745 P.2d 300, 304 (Ct.
App. 1987), the language of LC.§ 19-4902 "reflects the limitation period for such
proceedings." In general, "post-conviction relief is available while an appeal is
pending." Id. Where "the post-conviction application is grounded in the same facts
and issues presented on appeal, summary dismissal is appropriate." Id. at 426, 745
P.2d at 305. Further:
If an application is based upon facts outside the scope of the
pending appeal, summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the
application may be either dismissed without prejudice or suspended
until the appeal is resolved. E.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d
556 (197 5). Such procedures preserve the interests of the applicant and
provide a common sense approach for handling concurrent proceedings.

Id. Suspending such a proceeding until it can be consolidated with another serves
to promote judicial economy. See Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214, 221-222, 579 P.2d
1197, 1204-1205.
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Here, Shackelford argues that "it is impossible to assign/parse the effect of
the fundamental Constitutional violations on each count tried - capital or noncapital. ..." (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2.) Shackelford further argues that "the
claims before this Court in the [Successive] PCR petition include both directly and
collaterally, issues involving death and non-death sentencing and guilt phase
matters ...." (Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4.) These arguments support the
determination that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing
to bring this proceeding at his own expense. Rather, to avoid unnecessary expense
and redundancy, a reasonable person would wait to bring it until after being
resentenced. At that point, Shackelford may want to again request the
appointment of counsel in this matter.
Good cause appearing,

It is ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP
ll(a)(2)(B)) is DENIED, without prejudice.
DATED this

'3 ""day of July 2011.

!J:",C\~

J ~ R. Stegner
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregomg
Order were delivered to the following as mdicated:
Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604
William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

-;
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[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
J..}-Ifand Delivery
~S.Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,
vs.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

Case No. CV-2001-4272

ORDER SUSPENDING
PETITIONER'S [SUCCESSIVE]
PETITION, DENYING HIS
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE ADDENDUM, AND DENYING
THE STATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)

______________ )
Petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a [Successive] Petition
for Post Conviction Relief Capital Case asking this Court to grant him post-conviction
relief and a Motion for Leave to File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. In Response, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition.
For the reasons stated in this Order, Shackelford's petition will be suspended and his
motion for leave to file an addendum will be denied, without prejudice. The State's
motion will also be denied, without prejudice.
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I. BACKGROUND
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder,
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts.
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and
imposed prison sentences for the other charges. Shackelford appealed and
simultaneously brought an action seeking post-conviction relief. In 2005, this Court
granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition to have his death sentences set aside,
found three other claims moot, and denied his remaining claims. Shackelford
appealed aspects of these rulings, and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho
Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions as to guilt and post-conviction relief
and remanded for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to LC. § 19-2515, as it
pertains to the two first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur.

Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel to represent him in his
underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000-260).
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause, a
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Capital Case, and a [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief Capital Case. The State filed an Answer to "[Successive] Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief' and Shackelford filed a reply. This Court issued an order
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denying Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause and also issued an Order
Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter, the
State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Shackelford

filed a Motion for

Leave to File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The
State has recently indicated that it will not seek a death sentence for the two
remaining charges in Shackelford's underlying criminal case.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Timeliness.
Title 19, Chapter 27, of the Idaho Code governs criminal procedure in capital
cases. Shackelford argues that LC. § 19-2719 et seq. applies to this case. Idaho
Code§ 19-2719 sets forth the special procedures which are to "be interpreted to
accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid
death sentence."
The State aptly argues:
In the case at bar, by virtue of Judge Stegner's April 8, 2005,
memorandum decisions and orders, and the Idaho Supreme Court's
June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in this
case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for
resentencing. Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence
to which the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 apply.
(Answer to "[Successive] Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief' at 6.) Further, the State
has since indicated that it will not seek the death sentence on remand. Since the
death sentence imposed in this case has been set aside, and a new death sentence is
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not being sought, I.C. § 19-2719 et seq. does not apply to this case.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), which is found in

§ 19-4901 et seq., governs "all post-conviction claims that do not involve the
death sentence." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2004). Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction
relief] may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later."
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Atkinson, 131 Idaho 222, 224,
953 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman v.

State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089-1090 (Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was remanded
for ·sentencing, Shackelford has yet to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree
murder. Even though the sentencing will not upset the judgment of conviction and
does not involve several of the charges in this case, it appears to be a "proceeding
following an appeal," as is contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(a). It is an extension of
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the underlying criminal action - part of the continuous stream of events. Therefore,
Shackelford has until one year after this Court imposes a sentence for the first
degree murder charges to pursue post-conviction claims.
According to Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 425, 745 P.2d 300, 304 (Ct.
App. 1987), the language of LC.§ 19-4902 "reflects the limitation period for such
proceedings." In general, "post-conviction relief is available while an appeal is
pending." Id. Where "the post-conviction application is grounded in the same facts
and issues presented on appeal, summary dismissal is appropriate." Id. at 426, 745
P.2d at 305. Further:

If an application is based upon facts outside the scope of the
pending appeal, summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the
application may be either dismissed without prejudice or suspended
until the appeal is resolved. E.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d
556 (1975). Such procedures preserve the interests of the applicant and
provide a common sense approach for handling concurrent proceedings.
Id. Suspending such a proceeding until it can be consolidated with another serves
to promote judicial economy. See Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214, 221-222, 579 P.2d
1197, 1204-1205.
Here, Shackelford argues that "it is impossible to assign/parse the effect of
the fundamental Constitutional violations on each count tried

capital or non-

capital. ..." (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2.) Shackelford further argues that "the
claims before this Court in the [Successive] PCR petition include both directly and
collaterally, issues involving death and non-death sentencing and guilt phase
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matters .... " (Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4.) These arguments support this
Court's determination that waiting until Shackelford is resentenced on the
remaining two counts before resolving his [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction
for Post Conviction Relief Capital Case is proper. Doing so will promote judicial
efficiency.
In addition, Shackelford's resentencing has been set for next month. As a
result, this Court's decision to suspend his Petition now should not result in any
prejudice to him.

Motion for Leave to File Addendum to Successive Petition for Post
Conviction Relief.
Since this Court is suspending Shackelford's [Successive] Petition for Post
Conviction Relief Capital Case, his Motion for Leave to File Addendum to
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief will be denied, without prejudice.
Good cause appearing,
It is ORDERED that Shackelford's [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction

Relief Capital Case is SUSPENDED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Disposition

is DENIED, without prejudice.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for Leave to File

Addendum to Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief is DENIED, without
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prejudice.
DATED this

Y~ y of July 2011.

Jl

n~

IV'R. Stegner
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing ·
Order were delivered to the following as indicated:
Donald Ray Barker
PO Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843
FAX: (208) 882-7604

William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
Dale C. Shackelford
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707
On this

~S.Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery
\:.t1-ff{J.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Fax
D-Ifand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE C. SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

CV-2001-4272

MOTION FOR REVIEW BY
DISTRICT COURT OF
PROPOSED STIPULATIONS
[IRCP 6(e) (3)]

COMES NOW THE PETITIONER, prose and moves this Court to review, and
consider entering an ORDER enacting the PROPOSED STIPULATIONS set forth herein
in the interest of judicial and party economy. Nothing herein constitutes a
waiver of any right, claim or other matter(s) by Petitioner, and SHALL NOT
operate as an adjudication on the merits of any matter unless specifically
agreed upon by the Petitioner and the State, in writing, and approved by the
Court (IRCP 4l(a)(l)(ii)).
Petitioner would move this Court to utilize the inherent authority vested
by law in facilitating an agreement between the parties to prevent ongoing,
needless and never-ending litigation in this case.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder,
first degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to
commit arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found Petitioner
guilty on all counts. This Court sentenced the Petitioner to death for both
first-degree murders,
Petitioner

appealed

and imposed prison sentences for the other charges.
and

simultaneously

post-conviction relief on all convictions,

brought

an

action

seeking

[capital or not] as required by

Idaho's Special Appellate and Post-Conviction Procedure for Capital
(I.C.§19-2719).

In

2005,

this Court

granted Petitioner's

cases

post-conviction

petition to have the death sentences set aside, found three other claims moot,
and denied the remaining claims. Petitioner appealed aspects of that ruling,
and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's
decision as

to guilt and post-conviction relief,

sentencing hearing pursuant to I.C.§19-2515,

as

and remanded for a new
it

pertained

to

the

two

first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March
7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur. Petitioner was
thereafter

appointed

counsel

first-degree murder counts (I

&

to

represent

him

on

resentencing

on

the

II of the amended Indictment) in Latah County

Case No. CR00-00260.
On March 18,

2011, Petitioner filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for

Cause, a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Capital Case), and a [Successive]
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Capital Case). The State filed an Answer
to the [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner filed
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Reply. This Court thereafter issued an ORDER denying Petitioner's Motion to
Disqualify Judge for Cause, and also issued an ORDER Denying Petitioner's
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter,

the State filed a

Motion for Surmnary Disposition, and Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
On July 8,

2011,

this Court issued an ORDER SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S

[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION,

DENYING HIS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADDENDUM, AND

DENYING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION. On September 28, 2011,
Petitioner was (re)sentenced by this Court in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260
to terms of ( fixed) life imprisonment. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal,
and the Office of The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was thereafter
appointed by this Court to represent
(re) sentencing.

That

appeal

Petitioner on

the appeal

from

the

is pending preparation and submission of the

record/transcript by the Latah County clerk/reporter.

II. ARGUMENT

Petitioner would aver that the action(s) and rulings which form the basis
of

the claims set

Post-Conviction
I.C.§19-2719

forth

Relief

in that

are
the

in

the

Petitioner's

appropriately
claims

therein

[Successive]

before

this

Court

arose,

and

(should

Petition

for

pursuant
have

to

been)

submitted within the petition for post-conviction relief prior to the setting
aside of the sentences of death by this Court in 2005.

Further,

[these]

claims, for the most part, relate to ALL counts of the (amended) Indictment
and those convictions upon which the Petitioner was sentenced.
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Because of the (unified) post-conviction procedures

l

applicable to the

original petition in this case fell under the mandates of I C. §19-2719 for
filing,

it is only logical that the "continuation" of that post-conviction

application, as is the [successive] petition in this matter, which bears the
SAME CASE NUMBER as that filed pursuant to I.C.§19-2719, must too be pursuant
to [that] code, as the action can not simply "change horses in midstream" and
become an action under the auspices of I.C.§19-4901.
Idaho

law

(citations

omitted)

is

clear

that

an

application

for

post-conviction relief may be filed, considered and adjudicated by a district
court concurrently with a direct appeal to a reviewing Court, so long as the
application for post-conviction relief does not contain the same claim(s) as
presented for review to the appellate court. In this [unique] case, only those
matters related to the (2000-01) trial are included within the [successive]
petition for post-conviction relief that is now pending/suspended, while only
those

issues

directly

associated

with

the

(2011)

resentencing

will

be

presented on direct appeal, with a separate (NEW) post-conviction application
being filed thereafter on the (fixed) life sentences pursuant to I.C.§19-4901.
While data/claims within the [successive] application could overlap based on
the same (murder) convictions and fundamental errors at trial which resulted
in conviction,

such is the nature of the circumstances presented

by

the

differences in procedure involved in this case.

l

In Capital cases, applications for post-conviction relief are adjudicated
first, and any appeal therefrom is combined with any direct appeal from
conviction, opposite of the procedure in non-capital cases, and the
resentencing to a term of (fixed) life will require petitioner to file his
NEW application for post-conviction relief pursuant to I.C.§19-4901.
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III.

PROPOSED STIPULATIONS

1). Petitioner would immediately move this Court to dismiss, without
prejudice, the pending/suspended petition for post conviction relief filed
pursuant

to I.C.§19-2719

(CVOl-004272).

Petitioner would be authorized to

(re) file a NEW application for post conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code
§19-4901 et seq. which would include all claims that were/would be included in
the existing (pending/suspended) post conviction relief petition, as well as
any claims related to the resentencing of the petitioner on Counts I and II of
the amended indictment in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260 on September 28,
2011 [which are not disposed of on direct appeal].

2). Petitioner shall be authorized to file a NEW Application for Post
Conviction Relief (APCR) within one (1) year of remittitur being issued on the
direct appeal of the sentenced imposed by this Court on September 28, 2011
(I.C.§19-4901).
any/all

claims

The Petitioner shall
which

have

not

be authorized

been

previously

to

include and

(clearly

and

raise

directly)

adjudicacated (upon their merits) in Petitioner's previous petition for post
conviction relief, or direct appeal from conviction.

3). Upon filing a [NEW] APCR pursuant to I.C.§19-4901 as described in ~l
above,

the Court shall cause a separate and distinct

case

number

to be

assigned to the NEW petition which is different from that case number assigned
to

the pending/suspended petition

filed

pursuant

to

I.C.§19-2719

(i.e.,

CVOl -004272) •
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4). Petitioner shall be authorized to (re) file a Motion to Disqualify
(Judge) pursuant to IRCP 40 in conjunction with the filing of the [NEW] APCR.

5). Any/all claims presented within the [NEW] APCR will be adjudicated

upon [their] merits, and any objections/defenses by the state that any claim
contained therein may have been presented on (direct) appeal would be waived.

6). That upon the filing of a [NEW] APCR by the Petitioner, this Court
will appoint counsel to represent the Petitioner in the action.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this Court grant relief as requested
herein in the interest of justice and judicial economy.
I

/ ~ c_

~~-

DATE: ~ ~ ~ I ; ; , _

Shackelford,
Petitioner, prose.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have mailed (served) a copy of the foregoing, postage
pre-paid to:
William Wofford Thompson Jr.
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 8068
83843-0568
Moscow, ID
On this

day of

I

2012
• Shackelford
#64613 / ICC
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
petitioner, prose.
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Dale C. Shackelfo rd
#64613 / ICC
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitione r,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Responden t.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2001-4272
MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE]
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, pro se, and moves this Court to allow the
amendment of the (pending) [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
in the interest of justice and clarity pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). Petitioner has attached hereto a copy of the amended petition
as required.
Dated this

51)..

day of

fa~

2012.

pA (f1 lp
Dale C. Shackelford
PETITIONER, prose
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Dale C. Shackelford
#64613 / rec
P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, ID 83707

If: 55

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-2001-4272
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
Evidentiary Hearing & Appointment
of Counsel Requested 1

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Dale Carter Shackelford (Shackelford), pro
se, and files this Amended [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
Petitioner

hereby

incorporates

herein

by

reference

in

its

entirety

the

preceding record in this case (No. CVOl-004272) and all exhibits, addendui;i and
matters collaterally related thereto as allowed by law and rule.
Petitioner states that the claims described herein entitle him to relief
requested pursuant to Article I, §§ 6, 13 & 18 of the Idaho Constitution, and
amendments 1, 5, 6, 8

&

14 of the United States Constitution. Petitioner

hereby, for each claim presented, preserves same for state and federal review.
BALDWIN v. REESE, 541 U.S. 27, 124 S.Ct. 1347 (2004).
Separate motions for Evidentiary Hearing and appointment of Counsel are being filed
contemporaneously herewith.
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Petitioner contends that

the

claims

presented

herein are distinctly

different from those raised on the (original) application for post-conviction
relief under I.C.§19-2719 or upon appeal therefrom. To the extent this Court
holds any claims, facts or prejudice therefrom described as duplicative, the
claims

are

presented

so as

to give

the

state courts

a

full

and

fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon
petitioner's constitutional claims which may have been unclear in previous
filings. PICARD v. CONNOR, ("[s]tate prisoner [must] present the state courts
with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts".) see also, DUNCAN v
HENRY, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam).
In each of the claims presented infra, Shackelford suffered substantial
and injurious effects due to the improper influences upon the jury from the
deliberate

and

especially

egregious

errors

perpetrated by

the

state

as

described. The errors described, combined with the pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct illustrated herein so infected the integrity of the proceedings
that

it

lessened

the

government's

burden

of

proof

and

thereby

denied

Shackelford's Sixth amendment right to a fair trial, made applicable pursuant
to the Fourteenth amendment, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
These errors, in affecting the entire adjudicatory framework, are structural,
and defy analysis by harmless error standards. PUCKETT v.

U.S.,

129 S.Ct.

1423, 1432 (2009) (quoting ARIZONA v. FULMINATE, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct.
1246 (1991)).
Due to Shackelford having been sentenced to death on the two ( 2) First
Degree Murder convictions, he was required to comply with the provisions of

I.e. §19-2719 et seq. and utilize the post-conviction procedures prior to
receiving a direct appeal review. This petition then is best described as an
"initial-review proceeding" as the term is used in MARTINEZ v. RYAN,

U.S.

~ - ' 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012).
In that the [only] basis cited by this Court in suspending the instant
proceedings was the

[then]

upcoming resentencing,

and the facts contained

within this (amended) petition are not within the scope of the direct appeal
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1

from the resentencing now pending in the Idaho Supreme Court, the suspension
on this proceeding should be lifted, and the proceedings resumed. PARSONS v
STATE, 113 Idaho 421

745 P.2d 300 (Ct.App. 1987).
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BACKGROUND

Shackelford was originally charged by Indictment with two counts of First
Degree (premeditated) Murder, First Degree Arson, Conspiracy to Commit First
Degree Murder, Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson and Preparing False
Evidence in 2000. A jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, and this
Court sentenced Shackelford to death for each of the First Degree Murder
counts and imposed the maximum sentences available on each of the other
felonies.

Shackelford

appealed,

and

because

he was

sentenced

to

death,

simultaneously brought a post-conviction action pursuant to §19-2719, which
resulted in the death sentences being set aside. The Court also denied claims
related to the other sentences and guilt phase issues raised in the petition.
Shackelford appealed aspects of the rulings made by the trial court on
post-conviction relief, and the state cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decisions as to post-conviction claims, and remanded
for a new sentencing on the two First Degree Murder counts. The U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued a
Remittitur.
In

March

2011,

Shackelford

filed

a

[successive]

petition

for

post-conviction relief along with a motion for appointment of counsel. In May
2011,

Shackelford

filed

a

motion

for

leave

to

file

an addendum to the

petition. In July 2011, this Court issued an ORDER suspending the successive
petition, denying the motion for leave to file the addendum and denying the
state's motion for summary disposition, all without prejudice. The Court also
denied without prejudice Shackelford's motion for appointment of counsel. The
Court identified the [ then] upcoming resentencing as the rationale for the
decision (ORDER, July 8, 2011, page 6).
In

September

2011,

Shackelford

was

resentenced

by

this

Court

to

consecutive terms of (fixed) life on each of the murder counts. The Court
appointed the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) to
represent Shackelford on direct appeal on the resentencing. That appeal is
still pending.
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ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN

I.

DID THE COURT'S IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 33

EFFECTIVELY

ELIMINATE

THE

NEED

FOR

THE

STATE

TO

PROVE

EACH

ELEMENT CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?
II.

DID

THE

EXCULPATORY

STATE'S

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL

EVIDENCE

CONSTITUTE

PROSECUTORIAL

MISCONDUCT

RESULTING IN A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW?
III.

DID

WITNESSES

UNCURED

AND

VOUCHING

INTERJECTION

FOR

OF

THE

CREDIBILITY

PERSONAL

OPINION(S)

STATE

OF
BY

DEPUTY

PROSECUTOR ROBIN ECKMANN DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND
DUE PROCESS OF LAW?
IV.

DID

INCREASING

THE

COURT

THE

DETERMINATION

VIOLATE

MAXIMUM

OF

FACTS

TERM

DEFENDANT'S
OF

RIGHTS

IMPRISONMENT

TO

WITHOUT

JURY
A

BY

JURY

NECESSARY TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO MORE

THAN TEN YEARS TO LIFE?
V.

DID

THE

LACK

OF

IMPARTIALITY

BY

TRIAL COURT JUDGE

DENY

DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL?
VI.

DID

INEFFECTIVE

POST-CONVICTION/APPELLATE

COUNSEL

ASSISTANCE
DEPRIVE

OF
PETITIONER

UNIFIED
OF

DUE

PROCESS OF LAW?
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1

LIST OF ATTACHED EXHIBITS
Exhibit A:

Affidavit of Dr. Roderick Saxey

Exhibit B:

X-ray (photocopy) of Victim A.
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1

COURT I S

THE

I.

(ACCOMPLICE/AIDING
OBJECTION

STATE I S

BURDEN

CRIMES

UPON

WHICH

TO

PROOF

IN

THE

PROVING
WAS

OVER

JURY

EACH

OF

CONVICTED,

No.33

DEFENDANT'S
INDICIA

OR

ELIMINATED

ESTABLISHED

BEING

DEFENDANT

INSTRUCTION

OF

EVIDENCE

SUFFICIENT

(ACCOMPLICE)
OF

SUBMISSION

ABETTING)

&

WITHOUT

AIDING/ABETTING

IMPROPER

THE

ELEMENTS

BEYOND

A

TO

OF
THE
THE

REASONABLE

DOUBT, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

It is well settled that aiding & abetting is not a criminal offense, but a
theory of liability to the commission of a crime (STATE v. AYRES, 70 Idaho 18,
25, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); STATE v. JOHNSON, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008);
U.S. v. SMITH, 198 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1999)), thus, one can not be convicted of
and the

being both the principal

aider

&

abetter

(accomplice)

in

the same

criminal act without running afoul of (double jeopardy) protections guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.
In Idaho, the law specifically limits the classification of parties to a
crime to the principal and accessories

(I.C.§18-203(1)

&

(2))

and does not

recognize accomplice (theory) as a means by which a person may be party to a
criminal act. As a result, the (accomplice theory) instruction (No. 33) which
was submitted to the jury at trial and applied to the essential elements to be
proven against
whether

the

influence

the defendant was improper. Where there is grave doubt about

trial

court I s

in determining

error had a
the

substantial

jury's verdict[s],

and

injurious

effect

or

that error is not harmless,

O'NEAL v. McANICH, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992 (1995); CUPP v. NAUGHTEN,
414 U.S.

141,

94 S.Ct.

396

(1973).

(Where a reviewing court is "in virtual

eguipose as to the harmlessness of the error,"

the

court

should

"treat the

error ••• as if it affected the verdict ••. ") FRY v. PLILER, 551 U.S. 112, 120-21
n.3, 127 S.Ct. 2321 (2007) (quoting O'NEAL, 513 U.S. at 435).
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In each of the crimes upon which the defendant was indicted and convicted,
Shackelford was charged as the principal, and there was no evidence put forth by
the state at trial that there was an accomplice to the crime ( s) , thus, the
evidence was insufficient to have submitted the accomplice theory instruction
(No. 33) to the jury.
The submission of Instruction No. 33 had the ultimate (and prejudicial)
effect of allowing the jury to "invent" or speculate to the existence of an
accomplice, and to assign/impute any, but not all of the essential elements that
were required to have been found against a single individual to any number of
theoretical accomplices in the likeness of a "Chinese Menu" (e.g., actus reus to
principal on element l of count l with mens rea to element 3 of count l assigned
to accomplice) without finding all the essential elements necessary to convict
attributable to Shackelford as the principal, or to any specific [theoretical]
accomplice.

This

relieved

reasonable doubt

the state of

( against the defendant)

its

burden of persuasion beyond a

of every essential element of the

crime(s) charged. FRANCIS v. FRANKLIN, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985);
see In re WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (holding that due
process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged). Further, Instruction No. 33 impermissibly shifted
the burden to the defendant to prove that an accomplice was not involved in any
of the criminal acts charged - despite the fact that the accomplice theory
( instruction) was disclosed to the defendant only after the close of all
evidence

at

trial

unlike

instructions

were

submitted

indictment ( s)

and the verdict misled and

preparation

and

the

presentation

facts
prior

of

the

in
to

JOHNSON
trial.

where
The

embarrassed

defense,

making

the

variance
the
the

proposed
between

defendant
process

in

jury
the
the

fatally

defective (STATE v. WINDSOR, 110 Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985);
BERGER v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935)i
It is presumed that

juries follow instructions they are given (WEEKS v.

ANGELONE, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 s.ct. 727, 733 (2000); U.S. v. OLANO, 507 U.S.
625, 740, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781 (1993)), thus, it is apparent that the jury in
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the Shackelford trial read and utilized the accomplice instruction (No. 33)
which impermissib ly allowed a finding of guilt even where it was impossible,
based on the evidence submitted at trial, to have found that Shackelford had
(committed) each of the elements set forth in the criminal acts charged. These
elements then must have necessarily been attributed to any number of
theoretical , unnamed accomplices , yet "found" against Shackelford as the
principal as authorized by Instruction No. 33.
Idaho Code §19-1411 requires certainty in the Indictment by mandating that
indictment be direct and certain in regards to (1) the party charged, and (2)
the offense charged. While it is settled that "one who has been indicted as a
principal may be convicted on evidence showing only that he aided and abetted
the offense" (U.S. v. INGLESIAS, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) emphasis
there was no evidence at the Shackelford trial alleging, implying or
proving that there was an accomplice, or that anyone except Shackelford
committed each act (actus reus) with the (requisite) state of mind (mens rea)
added)

necessary to convict. Idaho law permits an accessory to a crime to be indicted,
tried and punished, though the principal may be neither indicted or tried
(I.C.§19-14 31), though the statutes stand silent as to whether an accomplice may
be so tried. This is clearly due to the fact that accomplice theory in Idaho
does not exist in law.
Submission by the court of jury instruction No. 33, over the objection of
the defendant, provided allowances to the jury which obviated the need of each
juror to agree upon and/or find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each essential
element

including

the

elements

of

finding

"the

defendant,

DALE

CARTER

as required - committed each element of the crime(s), and instead,
allowed elements of each crime to be divided between Shackelford and theoretical
SHACKELFORD"

accomplices , then further dividing the mens rea and actus reus, without finding
that a single individual, either Shackelford or an accomplice( s) committed all
the elements necessary to be convicted of a crime, thereby violating due process
guarantees made by both the state and federal constitutio ns.
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Based

on

the

above,

Shackelford

could

be convicted only as either a

principal, or an aider/abetter of the criminal acts charged, not both, on each
of

the six

counts upon which he was indicted and ultimately convicted.

(6)

Alternatively,

Shackelford must be considered no more than an accessory as

prescribed by I.C. §18-205, punishable as prescribed by I.C. §18-206 (see also

r.c. §19-1430).
In

addition

to

the

above,

the

allowances

made

by the wording

of

Instruction No. 33 effectively elimates(ed) ability of the defendant to mount
an

alibi

defense

in

any

case

where

such

language

is

used

in a

jury

instruction.
As noted in the district court in its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS in denying Shackelford's Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel claim based on failure to request an alibi instruction;
"It also would have been inappropriate to instruct the jury on an alibi
defense where, as here, the jury was instructed that [Shackelford] could be
found guilty for aiding and abetting the commission of these offenses." (id at
page 41).
Clearly, the de facto elimination of the alibi defense in every Idaho
case by and through the logic that all crimes inherently contain aiding and
abetting (accomplice) theory, whether such accomplice theory was charged in
the Indictment or not (see JOHNSON, supra) could not have been the intent of
the legislature,

nor can such a conflict in

(law)

stand in light of due

process rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions.
Df1spite the ruling in JOHNSON (145 Idaho 970) a jury instruction that
constructively amends an Indictment implicates the defendant's right to have
the grand jury's charges control the offense actually tried, (U.S. v. JONES,
418 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2005)), and where a statute specifies certain things,
the designation of such things excludes all others (Attorney General Opinion
No. 94-3 citing PECK v. STATE, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820 (1942).
In combination with the fact that Jury (charge) Instruction No. 42 allows
the jury to disregard any (Jury) Instruction(s) where the jury finds that even
relevant

facts

do not exist,

the state's burden of proof was completely

eliminated, and Shackelford is due relief sought herein.
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(PREMEDITATED) MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (COUNTS I

&

II).

Counts I and II of the Indictment charging Shackelford as a principal
with MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (Instructions No. 6 & 7 respectively)
precluded the use of the (accomplice) instruction (No. 33) by specifically
charging Shackelford with the actus reus of shooting and killing the victims.
Because the jury was not instructed as to the limitations on attributing this
element to the principal and not an accomplice based on the Indictment,
(variance), the jury was allowed to conclude that some theoretical accomplice
pulled the trigger,

despite the explicit charge

that Shackelford himself

committed the homicide (actus reus). The jury was further free to conclude
(impermissibly) that each of the mens rea elements (i.e., willfulness,
deliberation, premeditation and malice) could be assigned or imputed to any
number of theoretical accessories, or to Shackelford himself, and not limit
all the elements required to convict to a single individual. Indeed, the trial
court, post-conviction, correctly realized that the jury instructions, as
given, did not indicate that the jury had found Shackelford guilty of being
the principal in the murders:
COURT: Well, do I have to find that he actually committed the
offenses or that he was responsible for the commission of the
offenses?
PROSECUTOR: That he's responsible for the commission of those
offense [sic].
COURT: Why doesn't the legislature -PROSECUTOR: I cannot cite you right now off the top of my
head what there is, but the finding that the death penalty
can be imposed, I believe, is-- it's my belief looking at
cases before that he is responsible for those deaths.
COURT: Well, because I don't think the jury instructions that
I gave necessarily found that he himself committed the
offense, but was -PROSECUTOR: I believe we argued that too,
didn't have to find that.
COURT: I think you did ••.
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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that the jury

(Latah County Case No. CR00-00260, Tr.p. 5938, ln. 4-20). Even the state
conceded that there is nothing in the record indicating that Shackelford
was convicted by the jury as a principal in the crimes charged:
PROSECUTOR: I do not believe that there is adequate - that
there would be an adequate record to show that the jury found
Mr. Shackelford directly committed the offense.
(Latah County Case No. CVOl-004272 [PCR] Hearing 11/16/04; Tr.p. 146, ln.
24 - p. 147, ln. 2). Because the actus ~ o f committing the crime charged
- as required in the Indictments - were not found, nor even listed as an
element which the jury must find before returning a verdict of guilty, the
convictions can not stand (variance).
In Idaho,

all acts constituting FIRST DEGREE MURDER are contained
within I.C. §18-4003 (et seq.), with Murder itself being defined in I.C.
§18-4001. In both First and Second Degree Murder, the mens rea of Malice
---must be found by the jury, and necessarily attributed to the same person to
whom the actus reus is assigned. Unlike Second Degree Murder however, First
Degree Murder requires the jury to find the additional (mens rea) elements
of premeditation, willfulness and deliberation (Instruction No. 13). These
"states of mind" too are all, individually and collectively, necessarily
attributable to the actus reus/actor (not to be confused with homicide
committed during the commission of an underlying felony or FELONY MURDER).
Because Instruction 33 allowed the jury to attribute any, some or none of
the mens rea elements to the individual to whom the jury attributed the
(actus reus) element (actually killing the victims) the conviction can not
stand. Where Malice was not imputed to the (actus ~ ) , neither first nor
second degree murder convictions could stand.
In every crime, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and
intent (or criminal negligence), I.e. §18-114. Because ALL the elements of
First Degree Murder could not have been found/assigned to Shackelford as a
matter of fact or law, either as a principal or as one among the
theoretical accomplices (aider & abetter) the convictions must be vacated.

AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

-

12

ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE (COUNT III).

As with Counts I

&

II, inclusion of Instruction No. 33 and the language

therein eliminated the burden of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
essential elements of the crime charged in the Indictment, and constituted a
variance between the Indictment and the verdict.
Both Instructions No.

18

(Arson Indictment) and No. 19 ( jury· charge)

specifically require the jury to attribute the actus reus of setting the fire
T "lr
•
in the garage to Shackelford. .ul.n.ewise'
the mens rea of "wilfully" setting the

fire must be specifically attributed to Shackelford ( "the defendant,
Carter Shackelford,
theory allowed

by

wilfully"

[Instruction 19,

Instruction No.

33

could

,r4]),

not

be

thus,

Dale

the accessory

applied

at

all

to

Instruction No. 19, nor to the charge of Arson as presented in Count III of
the Indictment. Failure to exclude Count III from the allowances made by
Instruction No. 33 prejudiced the defendant, constituted fundamental error and
the conviction must be vacated.

PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE (COUNT VI).
In Count VI of the Indictment (Instruction No. 29) and Instruction No. 30
(jury

charge)

the

requisite

element

that

"the

defendant,

Dale

Carter

Shackelford, willfully [sic] prepared false evidence" (Instruction No. 30, ,r3)
specifically assigned the actus reus of preparing the false evidence, and the
mens rea of
---

wilfully doing so to Shackelford.

In addition to the above, the assignment/allowance of accomplice theory
to ,r4 of Instruction No. 30 (i.e. , "with the intent to produce it of allow it
to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true")
and ,r5 ( "at a grand jury proceeding in Latah County which was authorized by
law.") allowed the jury to again assign accomplice theory to the mens rea
(intent) to a theoretical person, despite it being unclear to whom the actus
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reus was assigned.
undisputed

This variance is particularly prejudicial in that the
evidence submitted to the jury was that the [audio tape]

constituting the false evidence as charged was made (recorded) in the state of
Missouri (thus, element/paragraph 2, Instruction No. 30 could not have been
found as a matter of fact or law), and that the tape was turned over to Latah
County (Idaho) sheriff's deputies at the request/instruction of Latah County
deputy prosecutor Robin Eckmann by (co-defendant) Mary Abitz many months prior
to the formation of the grand jury noticed in the Indictment or jury charge
instruction. This precludes Shackelford from the role of actus reus or mens
rea on elements to the crime of arson as either an accomplice or a principal.
For the reasons set forth above, the language and application of
Instruction No. 33, and the submission thereof without sufficient evidence to
justify its submission to the jury, prejudiced the defendant, eliminated the
burden of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt essential elements of
the crime charged, constituted a variance between the Indictment and the
verdict returned, and the conviction must be vacated.

AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

-

14

CONSPIRACY

(COUNTS IV

V)

&

In Counts IV and V, Shackelford was charged with conspiracy to commit
(underlying) crimes. In each of these counts of conspiracy,

the jury was

required to find that in furtherance of the conspiracy, Shackelford committed
specific overt acts as listed in the Indictment (Instructions Nos. 22

25)

&

2
•

Instruction No. 24 defines Conspiracy as involving an agreement by two or
more persons to commit a crime. In combination with Instruction No. 33, the
jury was allowed to find that if one of the other listed co-conspirators (or
an unnamed, unindicted co-conspirator) indeed conspired with another - even
where Shackelford was not directly or factually involved -

that Shackelford

could be convicted on the Conspiracy counts based on the (accomplice) theory.
Indeed,

Instruction

instructions/elements,

No.

33

precluded

in

combination

the

need

for

with
the

the

jury

Conspiracy

to

find

that

Shackelford himself committed any of the overt acts required to have been
committed by Shackelford.
The failure to preclude the jury from applying Instruction No. 33 to the
facts/elements contained within the Conspiracy Instructions/elements included
in Instructions 22 & 25 eliminated the need of the jury to find, or the state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shackelford as either a principal or
an

accomplice,

committed

any of

the overt

acts,

or was guilty

of

the

conspiracies as charged in the Indictments. The convictions on Conspiracy to
Commit

First

Degree

Murder

and

Conspiracy

to

Commit

First

Degree

Arson

therefore must be vacated.

2

The Indictments required a finding that Shackelford performed !each] of the overt acts
listed, yet in the jury charge instructions, (Nos. 23 & 26) the jury was allowed to return a
verdict of guilty having found "one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one
of the !overt] acts" listed in the Indictments. This variance is prejudicial, reduced the burden
of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts charged by the Grand Jury In the
Indictment, and alone constitutes cause to vacate the convictions on Conspiracy.
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The prejudice resulting from the application of Instruction No. 33, is
compounded as it relates to the two conspiracy counts against Shackelford in
that

the

conspiracy

allegations

against

the

named

co-conspirators

dismissed by the state immediately after Shackelford was convicted,

were
giving

credence to the allegations that the state used the conspiracy counts as a
pretext to submit hearsay under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay rules.
The prejudice

to Shackelford

is

further

illustrated

by

the court's

colloquy at the sentencing hearing of (named/charged co-conspirator)

Mary

Abitz on November 1, 2001 - just one (1) week after Shackelford was sentenced
to a (fixed) life term of imprisonment on the Conspiracy to Commit First
Degree Murder by the same judge:
[COURT]: With respect to the accessory to a felony
charge, I'm having a difficult time differentiating between
Sonja Abitz and Mary Abitz through I think vigorous
representation was able to avoid having to plead to that
offense. Mary Abitz while reluctant to plead to that charge,
pled guilty pursuant to ALFORD v. NORTH CAROLINA. Were it not
for Marty Millar recanting her testimony earlier on, I would
have no difficulty imposing a conviction on that charge. Given
Marty Millar's recent change in her testimony, I think an
appropriate sentence is a withheld judgment on that charge.
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, which testimony are you
referring to, if I may ask?
[COURT]: Specifically with regard to the testimony at
which there was involvement by Mary Abitz in a conspiratorial
fashion. So, I am placing Mary Abitz on 10 years probation on
the accessory to murder charge.
(Tr.p. 138, ln. 24 - p. 139, ln. 18. STATE v. MARY ABITZ, Latah County Case
No. CR00-00262)

3

3

I ,C,§18-206 provides a statutory maximum sentence of five (5) years for the crime of
accessory £to a felony) despite the imposition of a ten (10) year period of probation. The issue
was ultimately rectified and the sentence satisfied.
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Based on the facts of this case, were Mary (or Sonja) Abitz, both integral
participants in the alleged conspiracy, found to have been either PRINCIPALS
or ACCESSORIES to the conspiracy

( as allowed by Instruction No. 33) , the

dismissal of the [arson and murder] conspiracy charges against both women left
no person with whom Shackelford is alleged to have conspired, or could have
committed the overt acts that Shackelford, as reflected in the record, clearly
did not, or in some instances, could not have committed.
Because the court allowed hearsay testimony during trial pursuant to the
co-conspirator exceptions regarding matters said to have occurred prior to and
after the dates the state alleged the conspiracy was in effect, the state's
burden of proof, based on the application of Instruction No. 33, and supported
by Instruction 42 in combination with the variance between the Indictment and
jury (charge) instructions, was eliminated, depriving Shackelford of a fair
trial.

*

*

*

[NOTE]: It is clear that the variance between the Conspiracy Indictments and
jury (charge) Instructions 23

&

26 was accidental, and was a result of the

bracketed [] section of ICJI 1101 pattern/model instruction [at least one of]
being included within the text of the instructions submitted to the jury as
elements where such was not included within the Indictment. Intentional or
not, the inclusion of this phrase constituted a variance which was prejudicial
and reduced the state's burden of proof.
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II. STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING REPORT AND
X-RAYS OF VICTIMS CONSTITUTES PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, RESULTED IN DUE
PROCESS VIOLATION, AND RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT.
On June 1, 1999, Radiologist(s) at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center
in Lewiston, ID, pursuant to orders of Pathologist (and state trial witness)
Dr. Robert Cihak, x-rayed the corpse of Victim A, subsequently identified as
Donna Fontaine and wrote a report as to the findings made 4•
The radiologist's report, along with attendant x-rays were not disclosed
to the defense before or during trial despite Dr. Cihak having testified at
trial to facts observed within the x-rays (Tr.p. 2181, ln. 9 - p. 2182, ln.
17). The report and x-rays were not discovered by/to the defendant until late
in 2004, well after the time the district court precluded Shackelford from
raising pro se claims within the (original) application for post-conviction
relief 5.
Based on standard autopsy reports disclosed to the defense by the state
prior to trial, it was known to the defense that the weight (mass) of the FULL
METAL JACKET(ED) bullet identified by Dr. Cihak as having caused the death of

Victim A (Tr.p. 2192, ln. 11-12) was approximately thirty five percent (35%)

4

All arguments and documentation related to the Petitioner's SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF filed in this action but not ruled upon are incorporated
herein by reference in their entirety, including exhibits/attachments thereto. Petitioner also
incorporates the Compact Disk (CD) of the x-rays (R. 1857), Diagnostic Imaging Report and the
AFFIDAVIT of Dr. Roderick Saxey dated 05 May 2005 as contained within this record herein by
reference.
5

In its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS entered on
April 8, 2005 in the above-styled case, the court held that given the limited relevance to the
Petitioner's claim that Victim A was not Donna Fontaine, that the failure to disclose the
Diagnostic Imaging report (and x-rays) would be dismissed per the State's request (id at pages
5 - 7). The claim herein however reasserts the (BRADY, et al.) violations, and asserts prejudice
related to the failure to disclose the report/x-rays, and the bearing such failure to disclose
had on the defendant's ability to contradict the state's theory of the case, the ability to
mount a justification or self-defense argument and other such collateral matters.
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1 1

lE:,ss weight(ed) as the bullet identified as having killed Victim B - and had
lost twenty-five (25) grains (weight) of it's original seventy-one (71) grains
(Tr p 2475, ln. 22 - p. 2476, ln 17), despite both bullets having been fired
from the same gun (Tr.p. 2478, ln. 1-5). All attempts by the defense team to
reconcile the discrepancy between the weight of the (originally identical)
bullets

went

unresolved,

utilized

significant

defense

resources,

and

restricted the options relating to available defenses.
Based on the radiological report and attendant x-rays, it became clear
that the bullet with more than a third of its mass having been "sheared" away
(Tr.p. 2474, ln. 15-18) had struck a very hard object before entering the body
of

Victim

A,

and

had

lost a

considerable amount

of velocity prior

to

penetration of the (neck), consistent with a ricochet, a means (of death) in
direct contradiction to the manner of death espoused by the state to the jury
of an execution-style slaying:
PROSECUTOR [Christensen]: I can also tell you that at
some point nearby [sic] the time the defendant takes aim with
Donna's .32 calibre pistol and essentially executes her with a
shot to the back of the neck in C4, which Dr. Cihak tells you
causes almost instantaneous death. (Tr. p. 5277, ln. 1-5).
The facts revealed in the x-rays dramatically illustrate that the bullet
had not been sheared or fragmented inside the body of Victim A, nor does the
missing

(mass)

Because a

appear inside the body ( AFFIDAVIT of Dr.

( full metal jacketed)

Roderick Saxey) .

bullet is considerably harder than human

cervical (neck) bones, a direct strike by such a projectile would have clearly
shattered neck vertebra, and or passed through the tissue were no bone
structures were impacted. Further, it is clear even to a layman that a human
neck bone is incapable of shearing/tearing away thirty-five percent (35%) of a
jacketed round with little more than a stress fracture, and the bullet simply
"sticking" to the bone (Tr.p. 2189, ln. 2 - 13).
Due

to

the

clear

and

convincing

nature

of

the

report

and

x-rays

indicating a ricochet of the bullet prior to entering the body of Donna

AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

-

19

Fontaine which contradicts the state's allegations that Shackelford killed
Donna Fontaine with an execution-style shot to the back of the neck, there is
a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a verdict other
than First Degree Murder.
The State has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable and
material either to guilt or punishment of the defendant BRADY v. MARYLAND, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). Whether suppression is willful or inadvertent
is of no consequence. Further, the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the accused extends to information known only to police STATE v.
GARDNER, 126 Idaho 428, 433, 885 P.2d 1144 (Ct.App. 1994); JACKSON v. BROWN,
513 F.3d 1057

(9th Cir.

2008). Where a reviewing court finds a material

BRADY/GIGLIO violation, and the suppressed evidence is not merely cumulative,
there is no need for a harmless error review, KYLES v. WHITLEY, 514 U.S. 419,
434 (1995).
In

post-conviction

proceedings,

the

state

conceded

the

[Diagnostic

Imaging] report and x-rays were booked into evidence at the Latah County
Sheriff's Office,
result,

but were never added to the prosecutor's file and as a

[petitioner's] trial counsel never saw it (MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, page 5). The state argues that
the evidence was placed on a list of all other evidence collected by the Latah
County Sheriff's Department, and that that list was disclosed to the defense
team,

however,

Chief Deputy Prosecutor Robin

Eckmann

represented

to

the

district court on November 15, 2004 that neither she, nor the prosecution had
a

copy of

the

evidence,

but

had

"first

read

it"

as

an

attachment

to

Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to Dismiss (R. 1857), (Tr.p. 458, ln.
23 - p. 459, In. 7 : CVOl-004272).

Petitioner leaves it to the Court to

determine the credibility of Chief Deputy Prosecutor Eckmann's statement, but
would point out that if the lead prosecutor in the case was unaware of the
existence of the diagnostic imaging report and x-rays prior to or during
trial, there is no possibility that defense counsel knew of it either.
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1

III. UNCURED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VOUCHING FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF STATE
WITNESSES IN COMBINATION WITH INAPPROPRIATELY EMPHASIZING ISSUES RELATED TO
DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER NOT RELATED TO THE CRIMES CHARGED OR EVIDENCE PRODUCED
AT TRIAL IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL CASE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL AS
GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

During

closing

arguments

at

trial,

Deputy

engaged in several instances of "vouching"
witnesses who had testified at trial,

for

Prosecutor

Robin

Eckmann

the credibility of state's

thereby providing personal assurances

and governmental backing of the veracity and credibility of those individuals.
Eckmann' s

comments

further

tended

to convey the impression to jurors that

evidence not produced at trial, but known to the state, supported the charges
against the defendant. These statements were not cured, mitigated or minimized
by any contemporaneous curative instruction
repeatedly and

to

the

jury.

Further,

Eckmann

impermissibly demeaned the credibility and character of the

defendant before the jury.
Eckmann' s conduct during closing arguments at trial clearly constitute
misconduct at such a level that (her)

actions so

infected the

trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process of law
(DARDEN v. WAINWRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); U.S. v. YOUNG, 470 U.S.
11-12

(1985)).

not give a

contemporaneous curative

instruction regarding the improper statements and

characterizations by the

prosecutor,

Because

the

judge did

l,

the convictions must be vacated. U.S. v. BERMUDEZ, 529 F. 3d 158

(2d Cir. 2008). ([P]rosecutor's statement that defendant was lying, especially
when

contrasted

with

comment

that

government

witness

was

"absolutely

believable" was improper. HODGE v. HURLEY, 426 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Further, Eckmann' s statements which inappropriately emphasized Shackelford' s
character were improper because such comments were not related to the crimes
charged or evidence produced at trial in defense of the charges
384).
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(HODGE at

By and through paragraph 7 of jury Instruction No.

2,

the

jury was

advised by the court that "Statements, remarks and arguments of the attorneys
are not evidence, but are for purposes only of assisting the court or jury in
their respective duties. Any such statement, remark or argument which does not
conform to the evidence or these instructions should be disregarded." These
two sentences, buried in the seventh paragraph of a boilerplate instruction,
(No.

2

of

43)

in

no

way

cured

or mitigated

the

significance of

the

statements/comments made by Eckmann, and can not be considered at all curative
in light of both the impact and frequency of the statements made during
closing arguments at Shackelford's trial:
> (ECKMANN): I also want to talk for a minute about why the testimony of
Bernadette Lasater and Marty Millar I believe is credible and should be
believed by you •••
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 3-9)
> (ECKMANN): Number one, their statements are corroborated. Corroborated
is a term that just means they're backed up, there's other evidence that
supports what they've said, other evidence exists.
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 16-19)
> (ECKMANN): But I would suggest to you that their testimony is credible
for several reasons.
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 13-15)
> (ECKMANN): And Bobby Emily, no reason at all to make this up, comes in
and testifies before you, under oath ...
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 22-24)

> (ECKMANN): Larry Thompson is absolutely telling the truth.

(Tr.p. 5422, ln. 18-19)
(ECKMANN): It's the defendant who's lying, not Larry Thompson.
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 18-19)

>

> (ECKMANN): She [Karen Abitz] is telling the truth, and if she is telling
the truth, the defendant crafted and manufactured a complex and intricate
lie to cover up for this crime, but he can't have it both ways.
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 12-15)
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> (ECKMANN): He [defense counsel] could not bring himself to look at you
and tell you that Karen Abitz was a liar. He could not bring himself to
do it because she's not .
• p. 5423, ln. 8-11)
> (ECKMANN): Well, it's entirely believable to me.

(Tr.p. 5424, ln. 20)
> (ECKMANN): But there are some very important other statements in this
calendar that I think are worth noting, which I believe are credible.
(Tr.p. 5426, ln. 3-5).

In a long line of cases, Courts across the nation have maintained that a
prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of witnesses in that such
vouching carries with it the imprimatur of the government and may induce the
jury to trust the government's judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence (YOUNG, 470 U.S. at 18-19). The courts have also recognized that
where a prosecutor states to the jury that a government witness had no reason
to lie, that such a statement is improper (U.S. v. WEATHERSPOON, 410 F.3d
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Although each separate incident of Eckmann's vouching for the credibility
of witness is in and of itself prejudicial, the cumulative effect of these
comments is overwhelmingly prejudicial. Nowhere is such a single instance of
vouching prejudicial however than in the vouching for the credibility of
(state witness) Martha Millar. The following examples of just how prejudicial
Eckmann's vouching for Millar was is reflected in the record of Latah County
Case No. CR00-02022 at the sentencing hearing of Martha Millar on January 24,
2001:

(BY ECKMANN TO THE COURT): ••• and Ms. Millar exceeded our expectations in
terms of the value of her cooperation and I think the value of her testimony
to the prosecution of Dale Shackelford.
(Tr.p. 36, ln. 1-4).

AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-r.ONVICTION RELIEF

-

23

The Court made the prejudice even more clear in stating:

(COURT): I also sat through the Dale Shackelford
I and I have to say
that your testimony was undoubtedly very beneficial to the State. Whether
Dale Shackelford would have been convicted without that testimony is, as
Ms. Eckmann points out, anyone's guess. But I think it will suffice to say
that it was instrumental in Mr. Shackelford's conviction.
(CR00-02022; STATE v. MILLAR, Tr.p. 39, ln. 13-19)

Compounding

the

prejudice

of

Eckmann's

statements,

the

Court,

at

Shackelford's trial, refused to allow defense counsel to present to the jury
the extent of Martha Millar's deceit, subterfuge and lack of credibility, then
allowed Eckmann to vouch for that credibility:
(DEFENSE COUNSEL): Your Honor, it appears that the prosecutor is arguing
that if the state puts on a witness and that witness is a liar the defense
shouldn't be able to expose that person as being a liar. Well, that's what
cross-examination and credibility is all about.
(COURT): I don't think there's any doubt in this jury's mind that Ms. Millar's
an admitted liar, an admitted liar under oath, under numerous instances.
And the question I'm faced with is how many more of those do I allow, and
I think it is collateral. So I'm sustaining the objection [of the prosecutor].
(Tr.p. 3171, ln. 22 - p. 3172, ln. 18)

Where prosecutors make statements to the Jury which imply a personal
belief, the Courts have taken a stand (prosecutor's statement that defendant
was guilty was improper because [it] implied a personal belief rather than the
government's position. U.s. v. SMITH, 982 F. 2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993));
(prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding personal opinion of
defendant's credibility improper. BOYD v. FRENCH, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th
Cir.

1998) ) •

Robin

Eckmann' s

persistent

and

straightforward

personal

accusations and opinions that Shackelford was a liar, and that Shackelford was
not credible was incredibly improper and prejudicial (prosecutor's statement
describing defendant as a "liar" improper because [statement was a] personal
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opinion regarding defendant's credibility; U.S. v. GARCIA-GUIZAR, 160 F .3d
511, 520, (9th Cir

1998) amended by 234 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2000)).

As set forth above, Eckmann' s

(general, negative) characterizations of

the defendant were improper as well. In addition to HODGE, other Courts have
addressed the prosecutorial use of improper characterizations of the defendant
( see e.g.: MALICOAT v. MULLIN, 426 F. 3d 1241 ( 10th Cir. 2005). Because the
opinions and statements made by Eckmann were not in response to [defense]
counsel's statements, they can not be considered harmless. Additional examples
of

Eckmann's

improper

opinions,

statements

and

speculations

as

to

the

character of the defendant during closing arguments are included below:

> And he [defendant] could not control her with fear and intimidation,
although, he tried. Despite his best efforts he could not control her with
threats and with harassment and he couldn't stand it. So, ultimately he
exercised the ultimate control on her. He killed her and he killed the man
who was with her.
(Tr.p. 5302, ln. 6-11)

> And he [defendant] says that he does it to get her [victim] off his back,
that's Shackelford truth, but that's not truth in the real world. That's
not the truth in the real world. That was a twisted effort to torment her.
(Tr.p. 5310, ln. 22-25)

> [Defendant] Dale's persuasive, Dale is manipulative and on top of that
Dale is very reassuring. Things will be fine, I will not get -- I will make
sure you do not get in trouble. I will take care of you. When the truth,
of course, is that Dale Shackelford no more cared for these women than he
does for the butt of his cigarette that he tosses aside and steps on. Once
its function is served, he's done with it. It can be discarded without further
thought and moved on to the next useful item. Yet these women continued
to do what the defendant asked them to do and no one benefited from this
except the defendant.
(Tr.p. 5313, ln. 4-15)

> Why did they do did [sic]? It obviously wasn't the money he was
them, that wasn't a big factor. Sex obviously had something to do
But I submit in the end it was primarily two factors. Number one,
the defendant's literally astonishing ability to manipulate them
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paying
with it.
it was
To call

out of them what he wanted to accomplish in his end. And the second thing
is his apparent gift for identifying and targeting woman [sic] who are likely
to go along with that type of manipulation •
• p. 5322, ln. 16-25)
> In fact, this defendant uses people like they were paper towels. They're

just things he uses, takes -- wipes up his mess, throws them away. And not
only that, I think you'll all probably agree just based on common experience
that it's probably common for people who are accused of a crime to lie.
It's a human reaction that if you're accused of something and you want to
protect yourself you lie.
But this defendant does not just lie, he accuses. His lies are not
just, I didn't do it, but look who else did. He doesn't care who might get
convicted or charged as a result of his false statements. He does not just
lie, he accuses.
(Tr.p. 5350, ln. 9-21)
> Mary Abitz made the very same statements that Brian Abitz made to the
Suttons. She said the very same things. The Brian Abitz story, ladies and
gentlemen, is a move to -- is a twisted, incredible and cowardly effort
by the defendant to cast blame for his own criminal acts on a juvenile.
He has every reason to lie about it. The bottom line of the defendant's
statements is that they're hollow, they're self-serving, they're inconsistent,
and they are simply untrue.
(Tr.p. 5356, ln. 20 - p. 5357, ln. 4)

> And the truth in this case is that Dale Shackelford killed Donna Fontaine
and Fred Palahniuk and he did so with premeditation, with malice and with
deliberation. He conspired to do so with Mary Abitz and Sonja Abitz. He
burned their bodies to cover it up and he created false evidence.
(Tr.p. 5357, ln. 18 - 23)

> The person who is lying about what happened at that time and that location
is the defendant.
(Tr.p. 5422, ln. 23 - 25)

Basically the defendant's defense in this case is anything he can possibly
hope to get just one of you to believe. Just one of you is all it takes.
And so then he can just throw up all kinds of things that aren't consistent
with each in the hopes that just one of you will buy one of his inconsistent
arguments.
(Tr.p. 5432, ln. 21 - p. 5433, ln. 2)
>
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> Donna and Fred did not get to die with their loved ones gathered around
them. They died in the presence of the cold hatred of Dale Shackelford.
He took matters into his own hands on May 29th. He became a jury, prosecutor
and then decided the case in his favor and became the sentencing judge and
rendered his verdict and his sentence.
(Tr.p. 5437, ln. 7 - 14)

Based

on

the cumulative effect of the above,

the misconduct of the

prosecutor and the prejudice arising therefrom, the defendant was denied his
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, and
all convictions in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260 must be vacated.
Coupled with the allowance of impermissible hearsay by several witnesses
at trial (declared "error" by the Idaho Supreme Court in STATE V. SHACKELFORD,
150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582 (2010)) and the entirely circumstantial nature of
the case against Shackelford, the improper vouching and statements/personal
opinions espoused by prosecutor Eckmann were clearly prejudicial. Eckmann' s
improper orations during trial also had a cumulative effect that substantially
impaired Shackelford' s right to a fair trial, especially where the evidence
against Shackelford was

not

overwhelming,

and

curative

instructions were

insufficient to protect Shackelford from the prejudicial statements made by
the prosecutor U.S. v. CONRAD, 320 F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 2003).
Because Eckmann was not responding to any arguments made by defense
counsel [invited response doctrine], such argument presented by Eckmann
warrants the reversal of all convictions in this case (YOUNG, 470 U.S. at 13).
(See also U.S. v. HERJV!..ANEK, 289 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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Idaho Code provides that a defendant convicted of conspiracy "

shall

be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is
provided under the laws of the State of Idaho for the punishment of the crime
or offense that each combined to commit." (I.C.§18-1701)

(emphasis added.) It

is clear then that having been convicted of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree
Murder, where a sentence of death was available, and there [was] a requirement
that the fact(tor)s upon which the determination of punishment were to be made
were required to have been made by a jury, that Shackelford had the right to a
jury determination of facts which increased his exposure to a sentence greater
than ten

( 10) years to Life on the Conspiracy conviction as well.

RING v.

ARIZONA, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2848 (2002), A~~RENDI v. tiJEW_J:ERSEY; 530 U.S.
466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
Idaho

Code

§19-2515 ( 5)

provides

that

a

defendant convicted of

first

degree murder (where a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty was properly/timely
filed)

is entitled to a special sentencing proceeding.

If,

at that special

sentencing proceeding the existence of a statutory aggravating factor can not
be unanimously established by the jury, the maximum term of imprisonment which
may

be

imposed

is

ten

(10)

years

to

life

(I.C.§19-2515(7)(c)).

Because

Shackelford was required to be sentenced "in the same manner" and to the "same
extent"

as with

the

[underlying]

First Degree Murder convictions,

such a

special sentencing proceeding was required to have been held, and any facts
used to increase the sentence from 10 to life ( to "fixed" life as imposed by
the court) was required. STATE v.
(2010).

SHACKELFORD,
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The State filed a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty in Shackelford s case
on each of the First Degree Murder counts, as well as the Conspiracy to Commit
First

Degree

Murder.

In

dicta,

the

court,

during

the

sentencing

of

Shackelford, stated the following:
On the conspiracy to commit murder, I construe the
argument made by the State at the time of the sentencing
recommendations to withdraw the request for the penalty of death
for that charge and I impose a fixed life imprisonment for that."
11

•••

(Tr.p. 5999, ln. 22 - p. 6000, ln. 2)~ Despite the Court's "interpretation"
that the state had in fact withdrawn the Notice to Seek the Death Penalty on
the

Conspiracy

to Commit First Degree Murder count,

there is no motion,

notice, document or other indicia or data in the record wherein the state
expressed a desire to withdraw the Notice, thus, the Notice had not been
factually, properly or procedurally withdrawn, and was still in effect at the
time of sentencing. Shackelford therefore maintained the right of the jury
determination of the existence of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors
which would allow a sentence greater than 10 to life being imposed. The
considerably increased sentence of (fixed) life imprisonment as pronounced by
the court without jury findings was, and continues to be, in violation of
Shackelford's Sixth

amendment

rights

in

that

the

judge alone

found

the

functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense which allowed the
increase in sentence. BLAKELY v. WASHINGTON, 542 U.S. 296,

124 S.Ct.

2531

(2004)).
Based on the above, the Court must vacate the sentence of (fixed) life,
and resentence Shackelford to a term not less than 10 years, not to exceed
life, or initiate a special sentencing proceeding.
6

Petitioner theorizes that the Court was referring to a statement made by the state that
requested the "maximum [sentence] that's authorized by law" on each conviction. Prosecutor Eckmann
obviously misspoke, asking only for a life sentence on this "non-capital" crime, when the possible
maximum sentence on the Conspiracy to Commit Murder was death (Tr,p.5994. In. 21 - p.5995, In. 2).
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V.

LACK OF IMPARTIALITY ON THE PART OF TRIAL COURT JUDGE JOHN STEGNt;R
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

Judge John Stegner's exposure to inadmissible, unreliable and prejudicial
information regarding Shackelford, as well as to disputed evidentiary facts
from sources outside the record of ANY case, biased Judge Stegner to the
extent he could not fairly and impartially preside over the trial of Dale
Shackelford.
As a result of having been exposed to data regarding Shackelford, Judge
Stegner has, and continues to form and express his personal opinions regarding
Shackelford Shackelford

opinions not supported by evidence in the record, and which
has and continues to dispute. One such opinion formed and

expressed by the judge is that Shackelford had "manipulated, deceived, and
coerced others to commit acts they would not otherwise do." (R. 39398, pp.
64-66; 27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol. III, pp. 500, 502, STATE v. LASATER,
Latah County Case No. CR00-00264).
In refusing to set bail for Shackelford, Judge Stegner had formed an
opinion that proof (of Shackelford's guilt) was evident, or that there was a
great presumption that Shackelford was guilty of the crimes charged - even
before Shackelford' s entering of a plea ( Idaho Constitution Article I, §6
requires bail to be set in capital cases except where proof is evident or
presumption is great).
Judge Stegner' s propensity for making use of information outside the
record in forming opinions are reflected in his own words from the bench where
he recited data available exclusively from a Latah County Sheriff's Department
report:

[COURT]: Well, let's get to the point. This statement,
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is
some of the most incriminating testimony against Dale
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Shackelford . As I was saying, this statement is some of the most
incriminatin g testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior to
trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminatin g
testimony against Dale Shackelford . It didn't come out at trial.
And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz from
this statement.
(R.39398, p.67; 27966/31928 Supplementa l R. Vol. III, pp. 500, 502 (STATE v.
SONJA ABITZ, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr.p. 42, ln.
3-11)). The statement to which the judge referred was made by Sonja Abitz on
February 12, 2000 immediately after her ( and Shackelford ' s) arrest without
benefit of counsel, while in custody, during an interrogatio n by a law
enforcement officer. Again, despite Judge Stegner's mischaracte rization of the
statement as "testimony" , the statement was never even offered as evidence in
any case associated with Shackelford or any of his co-defendan ts. This
(uncounseled ) statement, available only as a police narrative, was never made
part of any record until Judge Stegner uttered these words in open Court. How
Judge Stegner came about this statement is still unclear, and subject to
discovery through an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Stegner' s opinion regarding Shackelford has also been made clear
post-trial. At sentencing (2001), Judge Stegner imposed the maximum sentences
allowed by law on all counts except Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder
( to which Shackelford was sentenced to FIXED life rather than Death as was
available), despite knowing that the recantation of (co-defenda nt) Martha
Millar was such that the conviction on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree
Murder was questionabl e (see Claim I, page 16 herein).
In resentencin g Shackelford in 2011, Judge Stegner stated on the record
his personal hopes that Shackelford would never be released from prison (Tr.p.
74, ln. 18). Despite his previous (2001) statement at sentencing that the
sentences would be run concurrent because there was no reason to "pile on"
(Tr.p. 6000, ln. 7-9), Judge Stegner, imposing the new sentences, ran each of
the (fixed) life sentences· consecutive ly, and each consecutive to the (fixed)
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life sentence imposed on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder, indeed
now "piling on" after more than 10 years of proceedings involving Shackelford.
Judge Stegner has also denied

every motion

by Shackelford

to

recuse

or

disqualify himself from each proceeding.
It

requires

has long been established that the right to due
an

Amendments 6
(2003),

impartial
&

14),

judge

(Idaho Constitution,

STATE v. SANDOVAL-TENA,

Article

process of
I,

138 Idaho 908,

§13;

law

U.S.C.

71 P.3d 1055

TUMEY v. OHIO, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In federal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§455 ( 1) provides that a judge must recuse himself... where he has personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
The rationale behind the federal recusal standards (statute) is concerned
largely with insuring that the [federal] judiciary appears to be impartial, in
addition to actually being impartial. U.S. v. SYPOLT, 346 F.3d 838, 840 (8th
Cir. 2003) • The standard reaches farther than does the due process clause,
which is concerned primarily with the individual rights of the parties. This
is significant because if a claim cannot pass muster under the federal recusal
statute, it cannot survive the more rigorous standards required of a claim
under the due process clause, (SYPOLT). (See also JOHNSON v. CARROL, 369 F.3d
253, 262 (3rd Cir. 2004).)
Although petitioner acknowledges the differences in state and federal
recusal standards, the premise that Idaho judges don't have to be as impartial
as federal judges can not be sustained. Based on the lack of impartiality of
Judge Stegner at and prior to trial, Judge Stegner' s personal knowledge of
disputed

evidentiary

facts

concerning

the

proceeding,

and

the

prejudice

suffered by the defendant thereby, the convictions in Case No. CR00-00260 must
be vacated.

AMENDED !SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

-

32

4

VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF

POST-CONVICTION/UNIFIED APPELLATE

COUNSEL

DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

In Idaho, the right of appeal is statutory (Idaho Code §19-2801; STATE v.
ANDERSON, 83 Idaho 263, 361 P.2d 787 (1961)). Further, judges are not required
to second-guess reasonable, professional judgments of [appellate] counsel, nor
to impose upon appointed counsel a duty to raise every colorable claim
suggested by a client (JONES v. BARNES, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983)).
In this case, Shackelford argues that [appellate] counsel's failures to
investigate, research or consider valid, colorable claims upon which relief
sought herein might have been granted did

not

comport with

the minimum

standards of professional judgment required of counsel, and was not within the
range of competence demanded
of attorneys by the courts (McMANN v.
RICHARDSON, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970)~ This is especially egregious
in Idaho where capital-case appeal and post conviction counsel are required to
be specially trained, experienced and held to a much higher standard than
non-capital qualified counsel (Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3).
Coupled with the ambiguity of which claims could be raised in which
proceeding (i.e., §19-2719, unified appeal, §19-4901, etc.) counsel had "put
off" raising various claims with the understanding that the claim(s) would
(only) be cognizable in the "next" phase of review. When Shackelford attempted
to raise claims pro se because

(post-conviction)

counsel failed to raise

[them], this court precluded Shackelford from filing pro se claims at all.
Because of this, the claims set forth herein are not procedurally barred, and
must be reviewed upon the merits.
Petitioner hereby reserves the right to amend, supplement and augment
this claim as necessary upon the appointment of counsel in this case.
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VERIFICATION
I hereby verify based on my personal knowledge the material facts
contained herein are supported by the record as described, are true and
correct, and are presented without intent of vexation or del{J.

Shacke~
Petitioner, prose

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS

!3

TH
DAY OF

~
NOTARY PUBLIC
l

My commission Expires:
SEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify by my signature below that I have caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF, attachments and exhibits thereto, along with the attendant Motions
for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary Hearing and Motion to Take Judicial
Notice to be mailed (served) upon the State by placing same in the hands
of the prison paralegal for mailing, postage pre-paid to:
Mr. William Thompson, Jr.
Latah County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843-0568
ON THIS

DAY OF

!-LY

.

)

Shackelford, PETITIONER.
#64613 / ICC
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID
83707
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Affidavit
J, Roderick Saxey, MD, based on radiograpbs submitted to me for review~ do solenmly
affirm the following:
i. The bullet seen as a metallic foreign body on radiographs of Victim A, in the r.egio.n of
the neck, is deformed and appears to have been sheared off. No smaller bullet fragments
are in this region.

2. It is unlikely that this deformity could have occurr.ed in the cervical spine without
substantial damage to the vertebrae or fragmentation of the bullet.
3. The cause of the deformity and shearing is not evident on the radiographs and may
have been caused by ricochet off a hard object prior to entry into fue body.

' ~

Roderick Saxey, MD

-qDATED this

5:c.---day

By: (Your name)

of_M~~~ -~---' 2005.

l(fJY.2fi(Zfd{=5fn;;z

M})

_ _ _ _ _ _~ - - - -

RIBED AND
V

Notary PubUc for

s;7

to before me this.;;;~day of

~

Washington

My commission Expires:

,e;/--/4-::

of

)7'k1J=- , 2005.

1 - )c -' ; ;;.-

00 01 4 9

Dale C. Shackel ford
#64613 / ICC
P.O. Box 70010
ID 83707

":

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DALE C. SHACKELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petition er,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respond ent.

CASE NO. CV-2001-4272
MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS

COMES NOW the Petition er, prose, and moves this Court to resume the
proceed ings in the above-s tyled case. Petition er states that the reasons /
purpose of suspend ing the action have been resolved (resente ncing), and that
the claims presente d within the post-co nviction applica tion are distinc tly
differen t from those raised on appeal from the resenten cing now pending as
stated within the applica tion (pg. 2 - 3).
DATED THIS ~ DAY OF

::S-~L;)

2012.

/JJd!J). /I~

~f!'~
. Shack el~
Prose PETITION
ER.

MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS

l

